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Transforming energy systems so that they are environmentally
sustainable is now a central goal for policy makers around the
world. It is widely understood that innovation has a central part to
play in this transformation, not only in speciﬁc low-carbon gener-
ation technologies and fuels, but also in systems and networks, in
consumer behaviour and in business models (EIA, 2015; Mitchell,
2016; IEA, 2016). While they are somewhat different in nature,
such changes are as signiﬁcant as those seen in the telecommuni-
cations sector over the last three decades, if not more so.
Analysis of the measures required to support innovation for
sustainability in the energy sector has tended to focus on key pol-
icies, such as subsidies for renewable energy technology develop-
ment and deployment, and increasingly in areas such as new
approaches to regulation for ‘smart grid’ investments. Such a focus
is understandable, as these headline policies do play an essential
role. However, because such policies require an enabling environ-
ment to be effective, it is also the case that all the governance el-
ements of energy systems need to be adaptable to change. If this is
not so, the danger is that governance arrangements at a deeper or
more background level, whether in planning rules, network
charging, technical standards or trading arrangements, may make
transformation slower, more costly or even impossible. Moreover, it
is a priori plausible that such ‘deep’ governance arrangements will* Corresponding author.
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likely to be a barrier to innovation in the energy sector (Geels, 2014;
Lockwood et al., 2017).
In this paper, we consider one element of this deep governance
challenge, in the form of arrangements for amending the detailed
commercial and technical rules found in electricity, gas and
sometimes heat networks and markets around the world. To bring
out the key issues, we examine in some depth the case of these
rules in Great Britain (GB),1 where they are known as energy in-
dustry codes. Such codes are effectively detailed multilateral
agreements that deﬁne the terms under which participants can
access networks and operate in markets, and are linked directly
with licences.
As in other countries, the codes system in Britain was designed
for conditions of technological and institutional stability, with a
focus on economic efﬁciency. To provide investors with greater
certainty and because it was believed that industry participants had
greater technical knowledge, the governance of codes was largely
delegated to the energy industry itself. This decisionmay be seen as
a particular choice of institutional design. However, institutional
designs also typically create unintended and unanticipated effects,
and become outdated in changing environments (Pierson, 2004).
One particular concern about the GB codes governance system is
that over time it has produced high levels of complexity and frag-
mentation which act as barriers to new entrants, and which both
arise from and reinforce dominance by large incumbent actors in
the process for changing codes. A second concern is the ability of
the codes governance system to respond to the coming trans-
formations mentioned above. Complexity and fragmentation
makes systematic and non-incremental changes slow and difﬁcult.
There is also a gap between the direction of high-level policy and
the formal objectives of codes. We argue that these problems
produce a high risk of regulatory capture, including informational
capture, and of regulatory inertia, and that the codes governance
system in Britain militates against the innovation required for
transforming the wider energy system.1 Because Northern Ireland has its own regulator and industry codes, the focus
here is on Great Britain rather than the UK.
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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reform the codes system, but these attempts remain piecemeal and
insufﬁcient. Most fundamentally, it is argued here that as long as
the principle of ‘self-authored regulation’ adopted in the 1990s
remains in place, codes will slow and sometimes prevent the
realisation of policy change. Here, we develop an alternative
agenda for reform, proposing a clearer mechanism for aligning
policy and code change, reducing the risk of capture and addressing
information asymmetries, while also addressing concerns about
regulatory risk.We also reﬂect on thewider lessons from the British
case for the governance of detailed energy industry rule changes in
other countries.
The following section brieﬂy lays out a conceptual framework
for thinking about code governance as institutional design. In
Section 3 we look at the case study of British industry codes,
including formal governance rules and the problems that have
arisen in practice, relating both back to the conceptual framework.
Section 4 considers proposals for reform. In section 5 we place the
British case within a discussion of governance frameworks for
detailed rule change in other countries. Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical approach
Detailed commercial and technical rules in energy systems
specify how actors should interact. These rules are governed in
systems which vary across countries, but that in each case specify
who can change these rules, under what conditions. Here, we argue
that as such governance systems stipulate ‘rules that assign
normatively backed rights and responsibilities to actors and pro-
vide for their… enforcement’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 12) they
can be seen as institutions. These institutional arrangements will
tend to be quite stable, with their design tending to reﬂect princi-
ples that seemed appropriate at the time of any major structural
reform in the energy sector of the country concerned. In the case of
Britain, many elements of the codes system date from the 1990s,
and were designed for conditions of technological and institutional
stability. A widespread institutional design principle for the
governance of these detailed rules, found in many countries, is
some form of delegation. That is, the job of changing rules is rarely if
ever undertaken by governments directly, but is delegated to
another body, often a relevant system operator in gas and elec-
tricity, and sometimes an energy regulator.
As described in more detail below, the British governance ar-
rangements are somewhat unusual in that they involve a ‘double
delegation’, ﬁrst from the government to the energy regulator, and
then from the regulator to industry. These arrangements are
sometimes described as a form of self-regulation, but since they
actually involve regulations with the power of the state behind
them, we argue that they are better described self-authored
regulation.
However, there are limits to the efﬁcacy of institutional design
for a number for reasons. These include the fact that institutions
have multiple effects, the likelihood of unanticipated effects, and
changes to the wider policy environment (Clemens and Cook, 1999;
Pierson, 2004). Moreover, despite any initial intentions, the work-
ing of institutions also tend to reﬂect and maintain inequalities of
power ‘by facilitating the organization of certain groups while
actively disarticulating others’ (Thelen, 2002: 92, see also Pierson,
2000). These considerations point to the possibility that over
time, and especially during periods in which policy is changing
rapidly, particular institutional arrangements in the energy sector
will become dysfunctional, even if they were originally well-
designed.
The design of code governance was based on assumptions about
a set of anticipated beneﬁts of delegation, but as Flinders (2008: 50)points out ‘whether these beneﬁts are delivered in practice de-
pends on a number of factors as well as an acceptance that dele-
gation may well entail certain costs, or at the very least trade-offs.’
Here we consider such costs and trade-offs in three areas: regula-
tory capture, informational capture and regulatory inertia.
One rationale for the design of British code governance was that
it would minimise regulatory risk, by making code modiﬁcation
subject to the control of industry actors and preventing the regu-
lator from enforcing arbitrary changes. In theory this should reduce
the cost of capital, and so ultimately beneﬁt consumers (Newbery,
1999). On the other hand, because self-authored regulation in-
volves a relatively high degree of independence of industry from
government, it also increases the risk of regulatory capture (Shleifer,
2005; Wren-Lewis, 2011). Industry drafting of regulation involves a
high degree of de facto control over the decision-making context,
stability of arrangements (avoiding the costs of continuous
lobbying), and the use of the monopoly powers of public authority,
thus going far beyond attempts at simply inﬂuencing the regulatory
process (Mitnick, 2011). The risks of distortion are potentially very
strong. It is unlikely that any single company will manage to extract
rent purely for itself through a code change, since it faces all the
other companies directly in the modiﬁcation process. Rather, the
concern is that incumbents will collude to use code governance
effectively to make entry by potential competitors more costly and
difﬁcult, as suggested by Stigler (1971).
Within the British code governance arrangements, and
frequently also in other cases, the regulator has a ﬁnal veto over
code changes, which is in part designed to act as a check on the
possibility of capture. This check will, however, only be effective if
the regulator has sufﬁcient expertise and information to judge
effectively whether rule-writing powers are being abused or not. In
the British case, an important second rationale for the institutional
design of delegating authorship of regulations to industry was
informational efﬁciency (Huber and Shipan, 2002; Flinders, 2008).
However, this rationale arises from the existence of asymmetric
information. In the standard principal-agent framework the agent
(company) is better informed than the principal (regulator), for
example about true costs of network services. The central problem
for the regulator is then how to extract information from com-
panies (this is the rationale for incentive regulation, e.g. Laffont and
Tirole, 1993).
The same problem exists in code governance, since the regulator
has to make a decision about modiﬁcations in the exercise of its
veto, based on information and analysis. If it is to be an effective
check on incumbent capture of rule-writing, the regulator has to
have enough information and expertise to make correct judge-
ments about whether speciﬁc modiﬁcations are distorted (Flinders,
2008; Baldwin et al., 2012). The more that the regulator has to
depend on industry itself for analysis and information the higher
the risk of ‘informational capture’ (Wren-Lewis, 2011), involving
partial, selective or misleading representation. The more complex
an area of activity, the more difﬁcult avoiding capture is likely to be
(McCarty, 2013).
A third issue is that independence of decision making, along
with formal remits that are hard to change, is built in to the design
of regulatory frameworks precisely to protect against the poten-
tially changing agendas of future governments. However, the
disadvantage of such arrangements is that it can create regulatory
inertia when wider policy goals, or other aspects of the environ-
ment such as technology costs, change (Faure-Grimaud and
Martimort, 2003).
3. The case of code governance in Great Britain
We now turn to the operation of the British code governance
Table 1
Main energy industry codes in Great Britain.
Area Title Description
Electricity
distribution
Distribution Code (D-Code) Technical parameters relating to the planning and use of electricity distribution networks
Distribution Connection and Use of
System Agreement (DCUSA)
Covers commercial aspects of use of electricity distribution network services
Electricity
transmission
Connection and Use of System Code
(CUSC)
Framework for connection and use of high voltage transmission system and certain balancing services
Grid Code Technical aspects relating to connections, operation & use of transmission network
System Operator/Transmission Code
(STC)
Deﬁnes the relationships between National Grid as system operator and transmission
owners
Electricity balancing Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) Sets out rules for participating in Balancing Mechanism and for settling energy imbalance
Electricity retailing Master Registration Agreement (MRA) Rules for retail market processes including electricity registration, change of supplier processes and the
Green Deal
Gas transmission and
distribution
Uniﬁed Network Code (UNC) Deﬁnes the rights and responsibilities for users of the gas transportation systems, and provides for all
system users to have equal access to transportation services
Gas retailing Supply Point Administration
Agreement (SPAA)
Sets out the inter-operational arrangements between gas suppliers and transporters in the UK retail
market
Gas and electricity
smart metering
Smart Energy Code (SEC) Deﬁnes the rights and obligations of energy suppliers, network operators and other relevant parties
involved in the end to end management of smart metering in Great Britain.
Source: Licences, Code and Standard documents.
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Section 2. The evidence and analysis presented here is based on a
review of relevant documentation, including code websites, re-
views by the energy regulator, the Ofﬁce of Gas and Electricity
Markets (Ofgem) in 2008 and 2013, evidence from the Competition
and Market Authority's (CMA) energy investigation, interviews
with Ofgem staff and some codes parties, and aworkshop involving
many of the major stakeholders in October 2015. A more detailed
account is given in Lockwood et al. (2015).3.1. Formal governance framework
To obtain a licence to operate in the gas or electricity sectors in
Great Britain, companies are obliged to become party to, and
comply with, relevant industry codes and related technical stan-
dards. These codes set rules for a large range of practices including:
terms of access and connection to networks; charging methodol-
ogies; network planning and operation; data reporting and man-
agement; requirements, and rewards and penalties in balancing
mechanisms. The ten main GB codes are shown in Table 1.
Each code has some form of panel or board which ‘owns’ the
code and is responsible for overseeing the change, or ‘modiﬁcation’,
process. All codes also have an administrator body to maintain the
codes and support the code modiﬁcation process on a day-to-day
basis. A modiﬁcation (or ‘mod’) to a code is usually proposed by
any party to the code, and in some cases, certain named outside
bodies as well. Since 2008, the modiﬁcation process has then been
split into three tracks (Table 2). One is for minor modiﬁcations with
‘non-material’ impacts on code parties, which are handled entirely
by industry on a ‘self-governance’ route. The assessment of the
proposal is managed by the panel. Each code has its own speciﬁc
procedure, although there are some common elements including
referral to specialist work-groups for assessment of complex
modiﬁcations and industry consultation on options. Panels then
adopt or reject the modiﬁcation.
The second track is for modiﬁcations that have more major
consequences for parties. These are handled in the manner
described above for the self-governance route, except that panels
cannot decide on the modiﬁcation themselves but rather make
recommendations to approve or reject, with the ﬁnal decision2 So far there have been four SCRs, covering gas security of supply, electricity
balancing arrangements, electricity transmission charging and faster switching.made by Ofgem. Thirdly, where Ofgem takes the view that policy
change and the carrying out of its duties require it, the regulator
itself can instigate a Signiﬁcant Code Review (SCR) process.2
However, while Ofgem could prepare the ground by carrying out
analysis of changes needed and their likely impacts, it could not
raise a modiﬁcation itself; instead it would have to direct a licensee
to do so on its behalf. As with an ordinary modiﬁcation, Ofgem
retains ﬁnal decision powers.
As discussed above, these formal rules entail a double delega-
tion of governance, which involves a number of potential trade-offs.
We now consider each of these in turn.3.2. Minimising regulatory risk vs. risk of regulatory capture
The ﬁrst trade-off was that between the risk of regulatory cap-
ture and the minimisation of regulatory risk, with the latter
intended to ensure a low cost of capital. There has been no sys-
tematic assessment of the claim that delegation of code governance
has in fact reduced the costs of capital, as against a counter-factual,
but a cursory analysis for networks raises some doubts about the
materiality of the effect. Had the introduction of the SCR process in
2010 increased perceptions of regulatory risk, one would have ex-
pected to see the cost of capital for network companies rising after
that date, had other factors remained the same. The actual cost of
capital for companies is commercially conﬁdential, but on the basis
of Ofgem's allowances for the weighted average cost of capital
(WACC), which are set through extensive research and consultation
with ﬁnancial markets, the reverse is in fact true. The allowed
WACC has fallen steadily from above 5% for price controls in the
mid-2000s to under 4% by 2014 (Table 3). Obviously, other factors
did change over this period, not least the sharp reduction in interest
rates after the ﬁnancial crisis in 2009. Nevertheless, it does not
appear that an increase in the degree of control of the regulator
over code governance, albeit a modest one, has raised the cost of
capital for networks signiﬁcantly. In practice, the cost of capital for
network and generator companies will be inﬂuenced by a range of
factors, of which code governance arrangements are only one,
possibly minor, element.
Against this, two features of the British code governance system
in practice raise concerns about regulatory capture. The ﬁrst is the
dominance of incumbent companies in code governance bodies. The
details of processes for determining membership of code Panels or
Boards varies, but they generally involve a mix of elections from
amongst industry parties (sometimes structured by type of
Table 2
Alternative modiﬁcation processes from the Code Governance Review 2008.
Modiﬁcation procedure Initiation Development Decision Implementation
Self-governance (fast-track and regular) Industry Industry Industry Industry (network owner)/code administrator
Ordinary Industry Industry Ofgem Industry (network owner)/code administrator
SCR Ofgem Ofgem ﬁrst then industry Ofgem Industry (network owner)/code administrator
Source: CMA (2015c: 467).
Table 3
Cost of capital determinations for network price controls 2004e2014.
Price control Year Vanilla WACC
determination (%)
Electricity distribution network companies (DPCR4) 2004 5.55
Transmission network companies (TPCR4) 2005 5.1
Gas distribution network companies (GDPCR) 2008 4.9
Electricity distribution network companies (DPCR5) 2009 4.74
Gas distribution network companies (RIIO-GD1) 2011 4.2
Electricity distribution network companies (RIIO-ED1) 2014 3.76
Table 4
Code Panels/Boards. Number of members by category, October 2015.
MRA BSC DCUSA CUSC D Code Grid code SPAA UNC SEC
VI supplier- generator 2 1 2 4 3 3 4 2 2
Network company 1 2 3 2b 6 10 2 5 2
Other Code rep. 1 0 0 0 0 2c 0 0 0
Other supplier 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2
Other generator 0 1 1 2 1 3 0 0 0
Other network 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Independent 0 8a 0 2a 3a 2 0 1 4
Consumer rep. 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1d
Total 4 12 6 11 15 20 8 12 11
% VI 50% 8% 33% 36% 20% 15% 50% 17% 18%
% VI þ network 75% 25% 83% 55% 60% 65% 75% 58% 36%
Independent chair No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No
Source: Code websites, SSE (2015).
Notes: Excludes secretaries and GEMA members.
a Includes one independent working for Energy UK.
b Only one network rep. is allowed to vote on a given issue.
c Includes Irish SO rep.
d Currently vacant.
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and the appointment of independent individual experts and a
consumer representative. In some codes, such representatives are
supposed to be independent, furthering the efﬁciency of the codes
system rather than the interests of the particular companies they
work for, but it is unclear how this is policed and, according to Good
Energy (2015: 6), this is rarely the case in practice.
Table 4 shows the make-up of the main governing body of each
code in late 2015. Between 8% and 50% of these bodies are made up
of members who are employed by one of a group of large vertically
integrated utilities that dominate both retail energy markets and
electricity generation.3 However, if the major regulated network
companies are also included, then the ‘incumbent’ group has a clear
majority of members on all codes except the BSC and the SEC. These
network companies are of course incumbents in a special sense, as
they are not exposed to competition in the normal way. Never-
theless, it is arguable that they have a vested interest in the
maintenance of the current situation. Beyond the bodies at the apex
of the governance system there are also work groups and sub-
committees where much of the detailed analysis is done, and the
basis laid for decisions. Here, incumbents tend to predominate3 Often known as ‘the Big Six’.more clearly because resource constraints mean that smaller actors
often do not have the expertise and time needed (CMA, 2015b;
DCRP, 2015).
A second issue is that the complexity and fragmentation of the
codes governance system means that the ﬁxed costs of compliance
and engagement with the codes system are disproportionately high
for smaller actors, de facto allowing larger incumbents to dominate
(CMA, 2015b: 22e24, Ecotricity, 2015). Code and other licence
documentation runs to over 10,000 pages (Good Energy, 2015),
with some individual codes being in excess of 1000 pages. The large
number of codes adds to costs and duplication, especially where
changes cut across multiple codes, because of a lack of coordination
across codes (Ofgem, 2014). While there are some core common
elements, each code has separate information and communication
technology (ICT) requirements, process rules, reporting arrange-
ments, and credit and collateral arrangements, which also change
frequently (Cornwall Energy, 2014). Just keeping up with modiﬁ-
cations to codes and other licence conditions is a signiﬁcant activity
e there have been 241 proposed modiﬁcations to the CUSC since
2001, 275 to the UNC since 2005, and 327 to the BSC since 2010. One
major supplier maintains a spreadsheet with over 3000 line-items
to ensure compliance.
Beyond compliance, effective involvement in the code change
process requires technical expertise and signiﬁcant resource.
5 The sole exception is the new Smart Energy Code.
6 For example, when a small wind farm operator proposed a change to the CUSC
to give guaranteed connection and priority access to renewable generators in 2007,
it was rejected because while it was intended to support wider government policy
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meetings a year, and on average each modiﬁcation proposal may
require around four working groups, with more complex changes
needing more (CMA, 2015a: 8). While all codes share the basic
processes of developing, drafting, consulting and reaching recom-
mendations on modiﬁcations, each is different in its details
(Cornwall Energy, 2015).
3.3. Informational efﬁciency vs informational capture
The complexity and fragmentation of the codes system relates to
a second trade-off arising from delegation, between the informa-
tional efﬁciency and informational capture. It is very likely that
these features of the codes systemmake it more costly and difﬁcult
for the regulator to exercise its veto over modiﬁcation decisions in
an effective way. Ofgem currently makes around 100 decisions a
year on modiﬁcations, drawing on expertise from across the orga-
nisation.4 However, the complexity of codes is such that there are
gaps where the regulator is at a disadvantage relative to industry
and where external expertise is required. Ofgem has powers under
licences to request information from industry, but there is a ten-
dency for this information to be presented in ways that favours its
sources.
Wren-Lewis (2011) notes that the risks of capture may be
reduced by the representation of other interests, including that of
consumers. Some codes panels do have consumer representatives,
but as can be seen in Table 4 above, where they do exist they are in a
minority, and in practice these positions represent one or two in-
dividuals who are too thinly spread to be an effective balance to
industry representation. More generally, the complexity of the
codes governance system in fact weakens any type of external
accountability.
3.4. Regulatory stability vs. regulatory inertia
A ﬁnal trade-off was that between regulatory stability and reg-
ulatory inertia. As in other countries, British energy codes were
originally designed for a limited range of types of technologies,
scales and institutional arrangements. A major challenge is that, as
discussed above, all of these aspects of the system are now
changing, and the next ten years is likely to see a major trans-
formation in the way energy is produced and used. However, while
the current code governance framework is well-suited to delivering
incremental improvement, it does not readily support strategic or
transformational change of the type that will be needed (IET, 2014;
CMA, 2015a; Ofgem, 2015a).
One problem is that it is difﬁcult to coordinate multiple modi-
ﬁcations across codes. Moreover, many relevant groups, including
manufacturers of meters, electric vehicles and charging equipment,
the ICT sector, the home and building automation industry, aggre-
gators, end users and community energy groups, which are
currently excluded from the technical electricity codes will have to
be brought into the system (IET, 2015). Yet, while code adminis-
trators do communicate with each other, no single body is
responsible for addressing major changes that cut across codes
under current arrangements.
The risk of inertia also is also related to the risk of capture of
code governance by incumbents. Where such incumbents beneﬁt
from existing arrangements they have few if any incentives to drive
through modiﬁcations needed for transformational change.
Even more fundamentally, the objectives against which code
modiﬁcations are formally judged differ from the policy objectives4 Interview with senior ofﬁcial, Ofgem, 7 January 2016.of government. Code governance objectives still focus purely on
ensuring effective competition, cost-reﬂexivity and consistency
with European regulation. They do not include social and envi-
ronmental goals.5 Ofgem does take its remit (which has included
sustainable development since the 2000s) into account when
deciding whether to reject or accept recommendations, but this
comes very late in the process, and is both an ineffective and
inefﬁcient way of ﬁtting code governance to this remit. This situ-
ation means that it is effectively impossible to get panels to
recommend modiﬁcations for the direct purpose of improving
sustainability.6
4. Reforming code governance
4.1. Existing reviews
As noted above, Ofgem undertook a review of code governance
in 2008 (GEMA, 2008). This review was prompted by several of the
same problems that have been noted above. The main reform was
the introduction of the SCR mechanism (see section 3.1 above).
However, a number of problems with the SCR process have
emerged, including Ofgem's limited capacity, duplication of anal-
ysis, and the fact that Ofgem cannot itself impose a modiﬁcation
itself (Citizen’s Advice, 2015; Cornwall Energy, 2015). This in turn
has meant that SCRs have taken substantially longer than was
anticipated, with the ﬁrst three (gas security of supply, electricity
transmission charging and electricity balancing) taking between 32
and 44 months to complete (Ofgem, 2015a).
In addition, a code administrators' code of practice (CACoP) was
set up, urging administrators to be ‘critical friends’, giving support
especially to ‘under-represented parties, small market participants
and consumer representatives’ (Ofgem, 2015b: 4). However, while
it appears that the CACoP has helped smaller actors to some extent,
it has been unevenly applied and oversight of code administrator
performance appears to be weak (Good Energy, 2015; Cornwall
Energy 2015, EDF Energy, 2015). More fundamentally, governance
of code administrators seems almost absent (CMA, 2015c: 465), and
Ofgem has limited powers to direct them or sanction them for poor
performance against the CACoP objectives.
By 2015, Ofgem had acknowledged that these reforms were not
sufﬁcient, and opened up a further review of code governance. In
parallel, the UK's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) un-
dertook a review of codes and code governances as part of an en-
ergy market investigation. The CMA concluded in 2016 that the
conﬂicting commercial interests of code parties, their limited in-
centives to deliver policy changes and Ofgem's insufﬁcient ability to
inﬂuence the code modiﬁcation process all created an adverse ef-
fect on competition (CMA, 2016).
Both reviews made quite similar proposals for further reform.
Probably the most important of these was to give Ofgem more
power to drive changes in code governance more directly, with
Ofgem proposing to give itself new powers to lead an entire end-to-
end process of development andmodiﬁcation itself in SCRs (Ofgem,
2016), and the CMA seeking to give Ofgem the role of annual
strategic direction setting and powers to initiate and prioritise code
changes in order to meet this direction. Both bodes also made
proposals for strengthening the expectations of codeon renewables the panel did not believe it would support the narrower economic
efﬁciency objectives of the CUSC (Brattle Group/Simmons and Simmons, 2008).
Davenport (2008) gives further similar examples.
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a licensable activity with objectives against which performance
could be monitored. However, the implementation of proposals
from the CMA has been delayed by the recent change in
government.
While important, both of these reviews were limited in scope,
with the CMA review focusing relatively narrowly on competition
and harm to current consumers and Ofgem explicitly considering
only incremental changes to the framework set up by the earlier
2008 Code Governance Review. Crucially, neither of these ofﬁcial
reviews questions the fundamental principle of self-authored
governance.4.2. An alternative approach
Our starting point for an alternative approach is that there is a
need to move away from self-authored regulation in a strategic
way. Such a move implies relocating code governance, including
the proposing and development of modiﬁcations, entirely out of
the hands of industry and into a dedicated codes governance body
within the public sphere. The strength of such an approach is that it
would drastically reduce the danger of regulatory capture. As long
as this body is given a clear remit, linked directly to government
policies, the danger of regulatory inertia should also be removed.
However, such a reform also has potential weaknesses that we
argue can be avoided only through building in certain safeguards
into its design. These are the danger of increased regulatory risk
and the problem of overcoming informational asymmetry. It is clear
from the responses to even limited proposals for further increases
in the scope of Ofgem's SCR powers that these are the central
concerns of industry.7 At the most basic level, these concerns are
rooted in the perception that a public body that is able to write and
adopt code changes is both ‘judge and jury’. Issues arise at three
stages in the process: the initiation of code change, the process of
code change and the right of appeal.
One complaint is about short-term political pressures and “the
need to do something” leading to “inappropriate” interventions
(e.g. E.On, 2008), a concern clearly related to regulatory risk. As
noted above, the evidence that a more directed form of code
governance signiﬁcantly increases the cost of capital is weak.
However, in order to minimise perceptions of risk, there would
have to be clear and transparent links between major code changes
and speciﬁc policies, so that industry participants could be assured
that codes could not be changed arbitrarily by the code body itself.
In this sense, code change would then be part of the implementa-
tion of policy agreed at a governmental level, as a purely technical
process.
A second fear is that code governance located in a public body
would lead a ﬂawed process without consultation. There are in fact
incentives for government to ensure a good process for code
change. The ﬁrst is that in the absence of a robust and transparent
process that is properly followed, the government is open to Judi-
cial Review.8 The second is that government fears disruption and a
collapse in investment in the energy sector even more than does
the industry, so it has a strong interest in making code changes that
work effectively. Nevertheless, to counter the fear of ﬂawed process
(and to guard against any attempts by incumbents to recapture the
process by lobbying), there would need to be a robust and7 See the submissions at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/
code-governance-review-major-policy-reviews-and-self-governance-initial-
proposals-8409 and https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/energy-market-investigation.
8 As currently happens: RWE recently undertook Judicial Review of a decision on
transmission charging, but lost in July 2015.transparent consultation and decision-making process, laid out in
statute. Possible major code reviews would ideally be signalled as
far ahead as possible, somewhat along the lines of the strategic
work plans proposed by the CMA.
There is also a concern that even a well-intentioned public body
leading code change may impose misconceived code changes, or
changes with unintended consequences, because it would not un-
derstand the detailed working of the industry (RWE npower, 2015).
This is, of course, the informational asymmetry argument that
underpinned the principle of self-authored regulation in the ﬁrst
place.
On this issue, credibility can only be established over time by
ensuring that a body in the public sphere making changes to codes
does in fact have the necessary knowledge and expertise. Ofgem is
currently proposing to take on this role itself, by expanding its
powers within the SCR process. However, Ofgem is a large orga-
nisation with multiple responsibilities and limited resources. The
CMA argues that it has engaged with codes in an isolated, reactive
and piecemeal fashion, and does not have the incentive to devote
signiﬁcant resource to “systematically developing its knowledge
and understanding of the substantive provisions set out in codes”
(CMA, 2016: A10.4-4). Ofgem itself has suggested to the CMA that
“as an economic regulator it is not efﬁcient or effective for it to lead
on the delivery and/or take a prominent role in drafting and
implementing detailed and often technical code change in an on-
going basis.” We would argue that for these reasons, it is not
desirable that the function of code governance should be located
within Ofgem but rather in a new code management body with
dedicated resource and expertise. Such a body is likely to require
capacity across a range of expertise, including a detailed knowledge
of existing codes, electricity markets and networks, including
supplier-consumer relationships and consumer behaviour; detailed
knowledge of new and emerging areas and technologies; relevant
legal expertise; analysis of economic impact; energy systems
analysis; an understanding of IT, and project management.
There are other reasons for locating powers to manage code
change in a new body rather than in Ofgem. Ofgem is supposed to
be an arms-length regulator, independent of government, rather
than a delivery body. It also has a particularly close relationship
with network companies through its role as economic regulator,
but many changes to network codes actually affect network users
and customers as much if not more than networks. Separating
economic regulation and code governance would therefore be
desirable. Finally, by removing Ofgem completely from the up-
stream end of the code governance process, it can then play the role
of monitoring compliance with licence conditions.
There are also arguments for a dedicated code management
body taking on the current functions of the code administrators. A
single body would facilitate better coordination of cross-code
changes and allow for the standardisation and simpliﬁcation of
the current range of different practices, collateral requirements etc.,
where beneﬁcial, all of which would help support smaller actors.
There would be a single point of contact and website, plus basic
steps such as the accurate translation of code requirements and
code change proposals from legal and technical language into plain
English, and the provision of ‘one-stop shop’ guidance towhat parts
of the code landscape an actor actually needs to pay attention to.
This approach does open up the danger of the creation of silos in
what becomes a larger organisation than any of the existing code
administrators. This issue would have to be addressed through
designing the core strategy of the body in such a way to avoid such
silos, and linking this avoidance to performance indicators and,
crucially, incentives for staff.
Finally, industry incumbents are concerned that any move away
from self-governance to regulator-led or publicly-led code
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vidual companies or actors, although this should be seen as a last
resort. Under the Energy Act 2004, code decisions can be appealed
to the Competition and Markets Authority. This could simply be
continued.
4.3. Costs and impacts
The creation of new bodies is often associated with new costs,
which raises the question of whether institutional reform is justi-
ﬁed in terms of the beneﬁts. It is not possible to give a quantitative
impact assessment here, but some qualitative indication of orders
of magnitude can be outlined.
One useful source here is the impact assessment (IA) exercise
carried out for the 2008 Code Governance Review (Ofgem, 2010)
(there are currently no impact assessments for the 2016 CMA re-
view and Ofgem's further review). This exercise took one issue e
electricity balancing cash out arrangements e and made a com-
parison of what the regulator thought would have been the likely
impact of introducing a SCR process for this issue in 2005, as against
the status quo at that time. The IA assumes that the SCR would be a
quicker and less wasteful process than what preceded it, and that
part of the changewould involve a transfer of costs from industry to
Ofgem, since the former would do less analysis. The resulting es-
timate was that direct costs would decline by £2m over 5 years. In
practice, as noted above, the SCR process has not been as fast and
efﬁcient as Ofgem anticipated, and many of these savings may not
have been realised. However, these process cost estimates should
be set against the £100m of costs to consumers that the IA also
estimates would have been avoided by the faster introduction of
code change under an SCR.
We would make similar arguments here. British Gas (2015) es-
timates the annual cost of code administration across MRA, BSC,
DCUSA, UNC, SEC and SPAA alone at more than £10m in 2015. The
total cost of code administration may be of the order of £20e25m a
year. Through rationalisation, and because our proposal would in
practice mean the relocation of costs incurred by industry actors in
existing code panels and working groups into a codes body, we do
not anticipate major cost increases in the modiﬁcation process. We
would expect the number and speed of major code reviews to in-
crease, which may raise annual costs modestly, but not by an order
of magnitude.
However, as with the 2008 IA, the main point is that expected
social beneﬁts from policies e especially smart energy policies e
requiring code changes that would be made only very slowly or not
at all under the current system are of two or three orders of
magnitude higher than any likely organisational cost increases. For
example, a recent estimate of the value to consumers of a smarter
electricity system with storage and ﬂexible demand, which will
require quite changes across many codes, is £8 billion a year (NIC,
2016). An estimate of net savings in investment costs arising from
a smart grid strategy prepared for the Smart Grids Forum is
approximately £10 billion a year by 2030, and over £40 billion a year
by 2050 (EA Technology, 2012).
5. Discussion
The issues raised in this case are not unique to Britain; energy
systems across the world are undergoing transformation and
detailed rules in the forms of codes in all these systems will have to
be adapted to facilitate that transformation. British code gover-
nance lies at one end of a continuum of arrangements. It is unusual
in delegating so much of the initiating and drafting of codes to
private industry actors. As noted above, arrangements in other
countries do typically involve delegation, but this is mostfrequently to a publicly-owned independent system operator (ISO)
or transmission system operator (TSO). For example, in most US
jurisdictions, the governance of commercial and technical rules
falls under the Boards of ISOs (which sometimes include more than
one State) (Brattle Group/Simmons and Simmons, 2008). Changes
can be proposed by the ISO itself, with advisory boards able to
undertake analysis and make amendments, or by the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission, which also makes the ﬁnal decision
on code changes.
In Denmark, as in other Scandinavian countries, codes are
generally somewhat more principles-based and simpler than in GB,
and code changes less frequent. Modiﬁcations are handled by the
state-owned TSO Energinet, which reports directly to the energy
minister. Energinet runs consultation processes on proposed
changes, and generally makes an effort to consult with smaller
actors as well as larger ones. The Danish economic regulator then
makes a ﬁnal approval of changes. The system in Sweden is similar,
with the government giving high-level guidance and the TSO
governing energy sector rules, although the power of the regulator
is more limited (ibid). In Norway, the regulator governs a set of
general principles onwhich detailed rules are based, but these rules
themselves are written, and may be changed, only by the state-
owned TSO.
In these kinds of arrangements, the risks of regulatory capture
are somewhat different from those arising in the GB case. While the
danger in British code governance is about direct capture of the
process by industry incumbents, the danger in cases where codes
or their equivalents are governed by ISOs or TSOs is of indirect
capture by industry, including via informational capture, and of
organisational capture by the ISO or TSO itself. However, the danger
that such an arrangement will delay or prevent rule changes
needed for policy change determined by government is much less,
since publicly owned SO bodies can generally be given direction, or
steered through high-level guidance. The problem for governments
(typically energy ministries) is then one of informational asym-
metry, and their ability to tell whether SO bodies are indeed
changing codes in appropriate ways to facilitate policy change. For
many energy ministries this is likely to be a signiﬁcant problem.
Another relevant factor here is the degree of openness of the
rule change process. In Australia, while the Australian Energy
Market Commission (AEMC) is the ‘custodian of the rules’, but rule
change can be proposed not only by market participants, but also
by any stakeholder in the energy system, including the Ministerial
Council on Energy, the System Operator, federal and state regula-
tors, and, importantly, consumers and consumer representatives
(Brattle Group/Simmons and Simmons, 2008). Funding is available
for these latter actors to advocate for changes to the rules. It is also
worth noting that the rule change process in the US has some
quasi-judicial aspects, with difﬁcult or contentious rule changes
being handled in formal hearings, with evidence given in the open.
These types of change processes are more likely to reduce the risk
of regulatory capture, and should form the basis for the design of a
more open process of consultation in the British case.
The other relevant challenge that all countries potentially face is
that of regulatory inertia. In many countries the criteria against
which rule changes are judged, whether by SO bodies or by regu-
lators, remain similar to those in the British codes governance
system, i.e. relating to non-discrimination and cost-reﬂexivity. This
is because as in the British case, network and market rules have
been designed for economic efﬁciency rather than system trans-
formation. The 2008 review of code governance in Britain identiﬁed
this as a “fundamental ﬂaw” (Brattle Group/Simmons and
Simmons, 2008: 5), and it is likely to be a critical issue in detailed
rule governance reform. Gaps between rule change objectives and
policy objectives are also likely to be reinforced where economic
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system transformation.
6. Conclusion
Detailed rules for commercial and technical practices are a
crucial but often overlooked institutional element in energy sys-
tems. The design of governance of such rules will determine how
readily they can be changed to facilitate innovation in technologies,
business models and systems to allow decarbonisation.
In this paper we have explored these issues through the case of
energy industry code governance in Britain. We have argued that a
double delegation of code governance to the energy industry itself,
producing a system of self-authored governance, has led to a
complex and fragmentary system, dominated by large incumbent
companies, and with criteria for code change that are adrift of
important government policy objectives. These features suggest
that there are some problematic trade-offs in the institutional
design of British code governance, including high risks of regula-
tory capture, informational capture, and regulatory inertia.
These problems have persisted, despite reform efforts arising
out of a Code Governance Review in 2008. Our proposals for reform
are based on the argument that the principle of self-authored
regulation should be challenged more fundamentally. Code gover-
nance should be located in a new code management body, with a
clear line of accountability to government and a remit to amend
codes to facilitate a sustainable and efﬁcient energy system in line
with speciﬁc policies. We also argue that with careful design of
such a system, regulatory risk can be mitigated. Such a function is
best located not within Ofgem, but rather within a dedicated body.
Such a code management body would provide integrated and
coherent oversight of all codes, providing clear guidance to in-
dustry participants on the principles of the codes and a ‘one-stop
shop’ assistance function for new entrants and smaller actors. It
would need sufﬁcient capacity and expertise to carry out these
functions efﬁciently and effectively. We do not offer a full cost-
beneﬁt analysis here, but previous impact assessments suggest
that while costs of reform would be of the order of £1e10 million
annually, a more effective system would bring forward sector
transformations with a social value of the order of £1e10 billion
annually. Moreover, the need for a change in approach in Britain is
clearly linked to a speciﬁc set of challenges that the energy system
faces over the next few years. Once the major transformations in
this system are complete, and the pace of change slows, it may be
desirable to return to a more delegated approach.
The British case represents an extreme on the spectrum of
institutional designs for the governance of detailed rules found
across energy systems across the world. Nevertheless, these de-
signs almost always involve a degree of delegation, precisely
because the rules are so detailed, and so some of the underlying
issues apply far morewidely. In many cases, the primary delegation
is to state-owned system operator (SO) bodies, and so the dangers
of capture, including informational capture, relate to the relation-
ships between governments, SOs and regulators. In addition, the
gap between criteria for rule changes on the one hand and wider
policy objectives on the other that is found in the British system
appears to be quite widespread, and will need to be addressed in
most cases.
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